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I. Introduction
The law of civil liability in money damages for the sale of
defective or mislabeled prescription pharmaceuticals has long
presented a policy paradox. On the one hand, and from the ear-
liest judicial consideration of the risks associated with danger-
ous pharmaceuticals, courts endeavored to bring to bear the
fullest liability exposure upon manufacturers and sellers. The
logic then was, as it has remained, that the subtle dangers of
defective drugs can often be lethal, and that such dangers will
almost invariably be inscrutable to the untutored eye of the con-
sumer or patient. On the other hand, particularly following the
1963 American Law Institute publication of Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 402A and the influential comment k thereto,
courts and legislatures have taken an extraordinarily solicitous
and protective approach in crafting liability rules associated
with the sale of prescription products. In most states, this legal
solicitude has taken the form of a negligence safe harbor (from
the nominal strict liability applied to other products) for manu-
facturers that have developed and marketed a drug that has
been produced and sold in as safe a condition as then-extant
scientific and medical knowledge permits.
At common law, the consumer's right of action for an injury
caused by a defective product, including a defective or contami-
nated pharmaceutical or medicinal preparation, might be
barred for lack of privity unless by fortuity plaintiff purchased
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the preparation directly from the manufacturer.' In recognition
that the extraordinary risks posed by defective or mislabeled
drugs commended a greater flexibility for personal injury
money damage suits, an early exception to the privity bar to the
negligence cause of action for the remote vendee was fashioned
for the purchaser of a mislabeled or contaminated drug.2 The
rationale for this departure from the venerable requirement of
privity was explained in a widely-noted decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, which noted that the sale of a mislabeled
or contaminated drug to a consumer created the risk of "death
or great bodily harm of some person[,] [as] the natural[,] and
almost inevitable[,] consequence of the sale ... by means of the
false label."3
Thus, personal injury claims involving impure pharmaceu-
ticals, together with adulterated foodstuffs and products in-
tended for intimate bodily application, came to represent the
earliest categories of claims in which an injured consumer could
proceed against the manufacturer even without seller-consumer
privity. 4 Additional public policy reasons bore upon conclusions
1. See generally Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir.
1903).
[Flor the reason that in the cases of the character which have been men-
tioned[,] the natural and probable effect of the negligence of the contractor
or manufacturer will generally be limited to the party for whom the article
is constructed, or to whom it is sold, and, perhaps more than all this, for the
reason that a wise and conservative public policy has impressed the courts
with the view that there must be a fixed and definite limitation to the liabil-
ity of manufacturers and vendors for negligence in the construction and sale
of complicated [products] which are to be operated or used by the intelligent
and the ignorant, the skillful and the incompetent, the watchful and the
careless, parties that cannot be known to the manufacturers or vendors, and
who use the articles all over the country hundreds of miles distant from the
place of their manufacture or original sale[.I
Id. at 867.
2. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (N.Y. 1852). The New York
Court of Appeals distinguished the sale of such products from most transactions.
See id.
3. Id. (involving an action "to recover damages from the defendant for negli-
gently putting up, labeling[,] and selling[,] . . .extract of dandelion[,] . . . a simple
and harmless medicine, [and] a jar of the extract of belladonna which is a deadly
poison . . ").
4. See Halloran v. Parke, Davis, & Co., 280 N.Y.S. 58, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935)
(holding pharmaceutical manufacturer liable for failure to warn). For a discus-




of many state courts that design, formulation and informational
duties and potential liability should be imposed upon pharma-
ceutical sellers, be the claimant in privity with the seller or oth-
erwise. These reasons included, and continue to contemplate
today, the manufacturers' highly specialized knowledge of the
safety, efficacy and appropriate means of the production of
pharmaceutical products; as well as the not invariable, but nev-
ertheless commonplace, ignorance of the consuming public (i.e.,
the patient) about the risks and efficacy of such prescription
products.5
The special rules that have developed governing personal
injury caused by prescription (or "ethical") pharmaceuticals are
applied similarly to other medical products available only pur-
suant to a prescription by a health care professional. 6 In gen-
eral terms, sales of both prescription blood and biological
products, as well as prescription medical devices, are subject to
the same (and usually more seller-forgiving) solicitous liability
rules as are sales of prescription pharmaceuticals. The policy
favoring access to such therapeutically important and fre-
quently life-saving blood and biological products for which
achievement of complete safety is frequently unattainable has
resulted in certain rules, exceptions, and interpretations that
create extraordinarily high hurdles for litigants seeking money
damage remedies. 7
5. See Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1925), which
stated:
The defendant deals with the public to be treated with its preparations and
drugs, not on an equal footing, but with an understanding the public will
trust to the superior intelligence and general knowledge of defendant, its
agents and employees, in the manufacture and preparation of its products;
also, when its compounds, drugs, and preparations are placed on the mar-
ket, that they are safe, harmless, and beneficial in use. In other words, the
public relies on the truth of such statements employed in advertising by the
defendant, and does not seek expert advice from others regarding the pro-




7. See generally 2 DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAvis,
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 22:3, 22:6, 22:15 (3d ed. 2000).
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II. Restatement Second, Torts § 402A and Restatement Third,
Torts: Products Liability
A. Approaches Generally
Liability for bodily harm caused by the ingestion of pre-
scription drugs may be imposed in several ways: (1) upon the
physician who prescribes it;8 (2) upon the druggist who sells it; 9
or; (3) upon the manufacturer. 10 While the degree of care exer-
cised by a physician, health care professional, or the pharmacist
may affect the potential liability of a prescription product
seller," the potential liability of health care professionals is not
grounded in products liability, but is instead liability for profes-
sional malpractice. The full array of compensatory damages is
available to the person suffering injury due to the exposure to or
the ingestion of a defective pharmaceutical. 2 Upon a showing
of extreme, willful, or outrageous seller conduct, but subject to
variations in the law from state to state, the plaintiff may also
recover punitive damages.' 3
8. See id. § 22:14 (applying the traditional rules of professional malpractice to
pharmacists).
9. See id. Chapter 2 (pursuant to the rules of negligence), Chapter 4 (pursuant
to the rules of warranty), Chapter 6 (pursuant to the rules of strict tort liability).
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. h (1998). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt h. In general terms, retailers of prescription drugs and
medical devices are liable for harm caused by such products only if the retailers
are negligent or if the drug contains a manufacturing defect. (The RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS may be referred to as the Products Liability Restatement, herein-
after, throughout the text.).
10. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, CHAPTER 2 (pursuant to the rules of negli-
gence), Chapter 4 (pursuant to the rules of warranty), Chapter 6 (pursuant to the
rules of strict tort liability). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. h
(1998). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt f.
11. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, § 22:16.
12. For a discussion on compensatory damages, see OWEN ET AL., supra note 7,
§17.
13. See id., §18. For example, liability for punitive damages was imposed
upon one pharmaceutical manufacturer upon evidence that the defendant "knew
or should have known that its course of conduct was about to inflict injury and yet
continued its activities with conscious indifference to the consequences." Mulligan
v. Lederle Labs., 786 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1986). In Mulligan, punitive damages
were levied against a manufacturer of a drug that was developed for the treatment
of inflammation. See id. The plaintiff patient adduced evidence that, even during
the initial testing, the drug was shown to have pyrogenicity and purity problems,
and to trigger febrile reactions as well as potential circulatory collapse. See id.
Notwithstanding notice of both these potential problems, the evidence further
showed that defendant responded to a written inquiry from plaintiffs physician
5
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The Restatement Second, Torts § 402A does not differenti-
ate between prescription products and the universe of all other
products. Accordingly, with exclusive resort to the language of
§ 402A, a seller of a prescription product that is "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"
should be liable in strict tort even if the seller "exercised all pos-
sible care in the preparation and sale of the product[.]"14
It is readily apparent that application of the black letter
strict products liability § 402A to prescription pharmaceuticals
would create several troublesome health and liability policy ten-
sions. First, there is general societal recognition of the public
health benefits of bringing potentially life-saving prescriptions
to market as promptly as possible, giving due consideration to
relative safety. This policy premium on development and mar-
keting of new pharmaceuticals, including drugs of which the
use is attended by an irreducible element of known or knowable
risks, might be, in some degree, thwarted by a strict liability
rule that could have the consequence of making pharmaceutical
manufacturers less likely to push for early introduction and
marketing of important new drugs. 15 Second, a strict liability
rule, creating as it would a potentially greater breadth of liabil-
ity exposure than would a fault-based liability, could reasonably
be foreseen to have an immediate and deleterious effect on the
ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to secure affordable
third-party liability insurance coverage. 16 A third reason, mili-
tating in favor of a departure from a strict liability rule for pre-
scription products speaks in terms both of what (1)
precautionary measures a manufacturer might undertake to re-
duce the risks of liability; and (2) the plaintiffs conventional
prima facie showing of an alternative feasible design, is that
while manufacturers of many other products can evaluate the
engineering efficacy and the financial viability of alternative
and potentially safer product designs, the same does not go for
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals. A prescription pharmaceu-
listing some of these very side effects, only to be told that defendant "did not be-
lieve that Varidase could cause the symptoms that had been listed in the letter."
Id. at 865.
14. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
15. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (employing





tical, i.e., chloromycetin, is, if differently designed, no longer
chloromycetin, but rather a new pharmaceutical.
17
As developed in the sections to follow, the official comments
to Restatement Second, Torts § 402A implicitly addresses such
concerns. First, comment j thereto makes clear that the phar-
maceutical manufacturer is not required to warn of unknown or
unknowable product risks.'8 Rather, adequate prescription
product warnings or instructions need only address risks of
which the seller "has knowledge, or by application of reasona-
ble, developed human skill and foresight should have knowl-
edge .... ,,19 Secondly, many prescription products holding the
promise of major health benefits, "are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended use ... ."20 Restatement Second,
Torts § 402A comment k provides that for such products, "both
the marketing and the use of [the pharmaceutical] are fully jus-
tified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve."21 "Such a product[,]" comment k continues,
"properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."22
In jurisdictions that follow the conventional doctrinal ap-
proach to the products liability complainant's claim, the inter-
play of negligence, warranty and strict tort liability may affect
the liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Ordinarily, how-
ever, the effect of any doctrinal differentiation will be formally
identifiable but substantively insignificant. 23 In negligence, the
manufacturer's duty of ordinary care under the circumstances
is to sell a drug that by its packaging, labeling, warnings and
instructions does not create an unreasonable risk of injury to
users. Under the implied warranty of merchantability, a non-
defective drug that is otherwise deficient in one or more of the
17. See id. at 478. "While the defective equipment in Barker and other cases
involving mechanical devices might be 'redesigned' by the addition of safety de-
vices, there is no possibility for an alternative design for a drug like DES, which is
a scientific constant compounded in accordance with a required formula." Id. As




20. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478.






above safety-related characteristics is unfit for its ordinary pur-
pose. Likewise, under Restatement Second, Torts § 402A, a pre-
scription product with inadequate packaging, labeling,
warnings or instructions is considered unsuited to the limited
protections of Restatement Second, Torts § 402A comment k (the
operation of which is discussed in the section to follow) and,
therefore, constitutes a defective and unreasonably dangerous
product.24
For liability claims associated with prescription products,
the Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 6 takes the
functional approach adopted by § 2(a) - (c) to that Restatement
for manufacturing, design, and informational defects; subject-
ing these claims to special rules. 25 A manufacturer of a pre-
scription drug will be liable for harm caused by (1) a defect
arising in the manufacturing process; (2) a defective design that
renders the product not reasonably safe; or (3) inadequate
warnings or instructions that make the product's use not rea-
sonably safe.26
Products Liability Restatement §§ 6(d)(1) & (2) separates
seller warning obligations into two settings: (1) the prescription
of a drug or medical device chosen and prescribed pursuant to
conventional means; and (2) other circumstances in which the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the health care
provider may not have sufficient individualized contact with the
patient "to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the in-
structions or warnings."27 In the former situation, the Products
Liability Restatement preserves the "learned intermediary" rule
that permits the seller to discharge its warnings duties by pro-
viding adequate warnings or instructions to the appropriate
health-care intermediaries. 28 When recognized, this exception
to the "learned intermediary" rule has often been associated
with (1) mass immunizations; and (2) certain limited physician-
patient contact scenarios, such as prescriptions for birth control
medicines (which may trigger a manufacturer's obligation to
24. See infra Part III.
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 (1998).
26. See id.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 6(d)(1),(2) (1998). Restatement Third,
Torts: Products Liability § 6 places in black letter the rule in Davis v. Wyeth Labs.,
Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).




provide warnings and instructional information directly to the
patient.)29
III. Restatement Second, Torts § 402A comment k-
Unavoidably Unsafe Products
The great majority of courts, as well as most commentators,
considering the issue of applying a strict liability standard to
the manufacturer of ethical pharmaceuticals, have concluded
that applying such a standard would have a socially detrimen-
tal effect of inhibiting the contributions to public health made
by the manufacturers of many life-saving drugs. 30 In Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories, plaintiff, who had been administered a po-
lio vaccine manufactured by the defendant, brought a products
liability action when she later contracted polio and limited pa-
ralysis. 31 The appellate court reversed the lower court's ap-
proval of a strict liability standard, commenting that
application of strict liability to the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer could delay the marketing of beneficial products, and de-
ter the research and development of others. 32 The strict
liability standard, arguably suited to the "vast majority of prod-
ucts cases," the court suggested, "might not be appropriate with
regard to some special products that are extremely beneficial to
society and yet pose an inherent and substantial risk that is
unavoidable at the time of distribution. '33
Under Restatement Second, Torts § 402A comment k, the
manufacturer of a valuable, efficacious, but concededly danger-
ous drug should not be found strictly liable if it has provided
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 823-25 (1985) rev'd
on other grounds 751 P.2d 470 (1988). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 6(d)(1) cmt b.
31. See Kearl, 172 Cal. App.3d at 823-25.
32. See id. at 824-25. Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt b.
33. Brown, 751 P.2d at 475. The court in Brown explained:
During a rather confusing discussion of a draft that was to become [§J 402A,
a member of the [American Law Institute] proposed that drugs should be
exempted from strict liability on the ground that it would be "against the
public interest" to apply the doctrine to such products because of "the very
serious tendency to stifle medical research and testing." Dean Prosser, who
was the reporter for the Restatement Second of Torts, responded that the
problem was a real one, and that he had it in mind in drafting [§J 402A.
20011
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adequate warning of all potential adverse reactions which the
manufacturer, presumed to have the knowledge of an expert in
the field, knew or should have known to exist at the time of
marketing.34
A. Prescription Pharmaceuticals
One particular decision of the Ohio Supreme Court is illus-
trative of the application of Restatement Second, Torts comment
k to prescription pharmaceuticals. 35 In White v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court did not hold the manufac-
turer of a whooping cough vaccine strictly liable for a seizure
disorder that developed in a child as a result of the vaccination
because the court found that the vaccine was "unavoidably un-
safe."36 Evidence in that action showed that there was no effec-
tive alternative to the vaccination at the time of its
administration to plaintiff, and that adequate warnings of side
effects and adverse reactions were provided. Comment k's safe
harbor from liability is a limited one, however. No matter how
beneficial a pharmaceutical is when properly administered, if
the seller's failure to provide adequate warnings as to known or
34. See, e.g., Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ohio 1981); see
also Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 545-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
Comment k provides more fully:
k. Unavoidably Unsafe Products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treat-
ment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected .... Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no as-
surance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding
a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k. (1965).
35. See White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988).




knowable risks, and this proximately causes personal injury-
manufacturer liability will follow. 37
In another influential decision, Brown v. Superior Court,38
the California Supreme Court emphasized that comment k sug-
gests the necessity of a finding of blameworthiness or negli-
gence on the part of the pharmaceutical manufacturer before
liability may be imposed.39 In that DES action, the California
Supreme Court concluded that "comment k, by focusing on the
blameworthiness of the manufacturer, sets forth a test which
sounds in negligence, while imposition of liability for failure to
warn without regard to the reason for such failure is consistent
with strict liability .... -4o The state high court concluded that
prescription pharmaceuticals are presumptively "unavoidably
unsafe," and therefore entitled to comment k treatment, thereby
obviating a case-by-case analysis of either the public health
benefits or the therapeutic attributes of each ethical drug. Nat-
urally, such a presumption would operate only in circumstances
in which the drug's manufacturer provided warnings, instruc-
tions, and packaging consistent with the then-existing limits of
medical and scientific knowledge. 41
Not all jurisdictions have adopted the presumption of com-
ment k's applicability to all prescription drugs. 42 For example,
37. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1099 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) rev'd on
other grounds State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1994).
38. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 476 n.4. The court explained:
The test stated in comment k is to be distinguished from strict liability for
failure to warn. Although both concepts identify failure to warn as the basis
of liability, comment k imposes liability only if the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the defect at the time the product was sold or distrib-
uted. Under strict liability, the reason why the warning was not issued is
irrelevant, and the manufacturer is liable even if it neither knew nor could
have known of the defect about which the warning was required.
Id.
41. See generally Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881 (Okla. 1994). Tansy
was a penile implant action, in which the plaintiff alleged that the device failed
due to the rubbing together of its internal metal cables. See id. The Oklahoma
high court held that the evidence supported the finding that the device was an
"unavoidably unsafe" product. See id.
42. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992) (involving a
suit brought by an estate on behalf of a patient who committed suicide shortly




in Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,43 the Alaska Supreme Court declined
to follow the comment k approach of California and the majority
of other jurisdictions. Instead, the court held that a prescrip-
tion drug may be found to be defectively designed, and its man-
ufacturer strictly liable, when the drug fails to perform as safely
as an ordinary physician would expect, and the patient thereby
suffers injury.44
B. Blood or Biological Products
Contaminated blood and blood derivative products re-
present a persistent dilemma for sellers of such products as well
as for the health care providers involved in the administration.
Differentiable from most other areas of products liability law,
states have responded not so much by decisional law, but by
statute. All but a handful of states have enacted legislation es-
tablishing a negligence standard for evaluating liability of per-
sons or institutions providing blood products. 45 This legislation
was enacted in response to arguments of health care providers
that the application of the strict liability remedy to the provid-
ers of crucial prescription blood, blood-related, and biological
products will subject those sellers to debilitating liability.46
Most jurisdictions have enacted so-called "blood shield"
statutes which limit the claims that may be brought against
suppliers of blood and biological products. In general terms,
"blood shield" statutes state that claims against sellers may
only proceed upon a negligence theory, rather than in warranty
or strict tort liability.4 7 In Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hos-
pital,48 the Connecticut Supreme Court elaborated upon the pol-
icy underpinnings of such statutes:
43. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
44. See id. at 1193.
45. For a listing of states that have not enacted such statutes, see Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death From Blood Transfusion, 20 A.L.R.
4th 136 (2000).
46. See id.
47. For a discussion on negligence, see OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, ch. 2. For a
discussion on warranties, see OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, ch. 2. For a discussion on
strict liability under the Restatement Second and Third, see OWEN ET AL., supra
note 7, § 22.7.




"[Tihe public policy represented by these statutes is not difficult
to discern: blood transfusions are essential in the medical area
and there are not now, and realistically there may never be, tests
that can guarantee with absolute certainty that donated blood is
uncontaminated with certain viruses." These statutes reflect a
legislative judgment that to require providers to serve as insurers
of the safety of these materials might impose such an overwhelm-
ing burden as to discourage the gathering and [sale] of blood. 49
While there exists a consensus as to the goal of blood shield
statutes, their language and application vary from state to
state.50 One prevalent means of avoiding strict tort and war-
ranty liability for transactions in blood, blood products, or
plasma has been to characterize such transactions as the rendi-
tion of a service rather than a sale. Illustrative is Arizona's
statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-1151, which provides:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole human
blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the pur-
pose of injecting or transfusing them into the human body shall be
construed as to the transmission of serum hepatitis to be the ren-
dition of a service by every person participating therein and shall
not be construed to be a sale. 5 1
The second means adopted by state legislatures has been to
provide a "grant of immunity" to sellers of blood and other bio-
logical products from actions in strict products liability or im-
49. Id. at 810 (citations omitted).
50. See Weishorn v. Miles-Cutter, Inc., 721 A.2d 811, 814 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (affirming a grant of summary judgment for provider of blood platelets, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court referenced decisions that have interpreted the blood
shield states of a cluster of jurisdictions). The decisions referenced by the
Weishorn court are as follows:
Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1987); Roe v. Miles
Labs., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 740, 742 (D. Alas. 1989); Doe v. Travenol Labs.,
Inc., 698 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Minn. 1988); Doe v. Cutter Labs., 703 F.
Supp. 573, 575 (N.D. Tex. 1988); McKee v. Miles Labs., 675 F. Supp. 1060,
1063 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 722
(Haw. 1991).
Id.
To be contrasted, the Weishorn court continues by noting decisions in two ju-
risdictions, Maryland and Louisiana, approving application of strict products lia-
bility claims to commercial suppliers of blood or biological products; Doe. v. Miles
Labs., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1466. 1478 (D. Md. 1987); Shortess v. Touro Infirmary,
520 So.2d 389, 391 (La. 1988). See id.




plied warranty.5 2  The applicable Pennsylvania statute
provides:
No person shall be liable for death, disease or injury resulting
from the lawful transfusion of blood, blood components or plasma
derivatives, or for the lawful transplantation or insertion of tis-
sue, bone or organs, except upon a showing of negligence on the
part of such person. Specifically excluded hereunder is any liabil-
ity by reason of any rule of strict liability or implied warranty or
any other warranty not expressly undertaken by the party to be
charged. 53
It is seen readily that this prophylaxis against supplier lia-
bility, albeit with limitations, is the most supplier-protective in
all of accident law. This approach has been tailored to the bene-
fit of suppliers of a special subcategory of prescription in which
the provision of adulterated, contaminated, or mislabeled prod-
ucts can be expected almost invariably to cause death or serious
bodily injury. In the face of the gravest risks to patients, and
operating independently of either the Second or the Third Re-
statements, these blood shield statutes impose the highest bar-
riers to supplier liability. Stepping back from what may at first
be viewed as a harsh irony, the blood shield protections for
blood, blood products, and biological products can be seen as
representing the products liability policy high wire at its most
taut and highest elevation. The majority of the products at is-
sue here are employed in life saving surgery. The risks posed
by contamination are usually devastating. With no seeming al-
ternative for such products, and with time exigencies and test-
ing limitations arrayed against complete safety, the state
legislatures have taken the steps thought necessary to preserve
suppliers from potentially ruinous liability exposure.
IV. Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability § 6
Pursuant to Products Liability Restatement § 6,54 sellers of
prescription drugs, as well as other prescription products, in-
52. See, e.g., 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8333(a) (1998).
53. Id.
54. Section 6, entitled "Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm
Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices," states:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or
otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability
326 [Vol. 21:313
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/1
20011 THE ENDURING PARADOX
cluding biological products and certain medical devices, receive
a measure of legal solicitude that can be harmonized with the
decisional law.55
Most of these decisions have been reached with the gui-
dance of Restatement Second, Torts § 402A and comment j. 56
Similar to the liability that follows sale of any product with
a manufacturing defect that causes harm, the provisions of § 6
propose that manufacturers of prescription products that con-
tain a manufacturing defect will also be strictly liable for such
flaws. However, prescription pharmaceuticals that are claimed
for harm to persons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or medical
device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant
to a health-care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or
medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the
drug or medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in Subsection (c);
or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as de-
fined in Subsection (d).
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defec-
tive design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical
device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic bene-
fits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing such foreseeable risks
and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for
any class of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inade-
quate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings re-
garding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a position to re-
duce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warnings.
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device
is subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device con-
tains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care
and such failure causes harm to persons.
Id.
55. For its congruence with existing decisional law reached under Restate-
ment Second, Torts § 402A, many state courts may be expected to continue their
adherence to a Restatement Second, Torts § 402A cmt. k. approach. Cf., Freeman
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
56. See generally OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, § 22:3.
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to have a design or formulation defect are treated differently. A
claim of manufacturer liability arising from the design or for-
mulation of a prescription drug will prevail only upon a showing
that the product would be unduly dangerous for any class of pa-
tients, or specifically, when "reasonable health care providers,
knowing of foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would
not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients."5 7
A. Warnings and Instructions-Generally
The manufacturer of a non-defective drug is obligated to
provide such warnings of risks and instructions of reasonably
safe use as to permit the patient to make an informed decision
whether or not to follow the therapy the drug provides. The ob-
ligations to provide warnings as to pertinent risks and instruc-
tions as to duly safe use have been imposed consistently under
the Second Restatement and are carried forward without mate-
rial change in the Products Liability Restatement.
In the frequently cited Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision of Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,58 the court af-
firmed judgment for the plaintiffs. In Wells, a child had been
born with birth defects causally associated with her parents'
use of the manufacturer's contraceptive spermicide. 59 The par-
ents sued and presented evidence that showed the defendant
knew or should have known of studies indicating that the use of
spermicides might increase the risk of birth defects several
years prior to plaintiffs use of the product. 60 Similarly, another
court reversed a lower court's decision and denied summary
judgment based upon its conclusion that plaintiffs raised mate-
rial issues of fact whether the defendant manufacturer of De-
porovera had a duty to warn of incidents of cancer in humans
associated with use of the drug.61
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 C (1998).
58. 788 F.2d 741 (l1th Cir.1986).
59. See id. at 746.
60. See id.
61. See Popham v. Reyner, 503 N.Y.S.2d 645, 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). See
also Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories, Inc., 695 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(held: fact issue of warning adequacy existed as to manufacturer's package insert
that did not contain information concerning risks to third persons who would come




Courts are virtually uniform in imposing warning duties
only as they apply to adverse reactions or side effects of which
the manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of
manufacture. 62 Thus, courts in all jurisdictions adhere to a rule
imposing a high standard of care for the manufacturers' prepa-
ration and testing of drugs.63 However, the standard is inter-
preted in terms of reasonable, not hypothetical, scientific and
medical forseeability. 64 Illustrative is the decision in McElha-
ney v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,65 in which the court, interpreting Restate-
ment Second, Torts § 402A commentj emphasized that warning
duties are confined to such subjects as to which it "has knowl-
edge, or by the application of reasonably developed human skill
and foresight, should have knowledge." 66 The court ultimately
held that a manufacturer of DES had a duty to warn of possible
adverse side effects "of which it knew, or reasonably should
have known, at the time plaintiffs mother ingested the drug."67
Where the plaintiffs evidence suggests that the prescribing
physician would not have prescribed the drug if he had read a
package insert containing a warning of the type proposed as ad-
equate by plaintiff, plaintiffs claim of warning inadequacy
should be permitted to go to the jury.68 Similarly, if the evi-
dence suggests that the prescribing physician would have, in all
probability, prescribed another drug, plaintiffs claim of warn-
ing inadequacy should also be permitted to go to the jury.69
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). See also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt b (standard for proving design defect includes
assessment of "risks that were known or reasonably should have been known" to a
"reasonable health care provider.").
63. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 99, 661 (4th ed. 1971). See also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 96, 688 (5 th ed. 1984).
64. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 99, 661 (4th ed. 1971). See also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 96, 688 (5 th ed. 1984).
65. 575 F. Supp. 228 (D.S.D. 1983).
66. Id. at page 231 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j
(1965)).
67. Id. at 231-32 (finding no duty to warn for want of constructive
knowledge).
68. See Reeder v. Hammond, 336 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
69. See id. In contrast, compare Reeder with Bealer v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc., 729 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. La. 1990) (woman pregnant while taking dermatological
drug underwent therapeutic abortion due to high risk of birth defects associated
with use during pregnancy; held that a manufacturer discharged duty to warn by
providing adequate warnings to the plaintiffs physician).
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An otherwise suitable warning may be vitiated by the con-
duct of the manufacturer or those acting at the direction of the
manufacturer if they promote the product in such a fashion as
to obscure or lessen the cautionary impact of the seller's warn-
ings. For example, it has been held that a physician's receipt of
the seller's desk calendar promoting the ethical pharmaceutical,
together with a package sample containing a warning concern-
ing the drug, could permit a jury to infer "that the absence of a
warning on an advertisement for the use of a drug as poten-
tially dangerous as chloromycetin was a form of overpromotion
which [weakened] the effect of even a valid warning on the
package."70
1. To Whom Warnings Must be Given-Generally
The duty of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to provide ade-
quate warnings and instructions is interpreted as providing
that, except in limited circumstances, 71 the pharmaceutical
seller satisfies its duty to warn by providing timely and ade-
quate information regarding the product to the medical profes-
sion, with the individual physician taking the role as the
"learned intermediary" between the product seller and the indi-
vidual patient.72 As expressed by one court, "manufacturers of
70. Salmon v. Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975) (cita-
tions omitted). In Salmon, the 4 th Circuit stated that "[tihe likelihood of over-
promotion by advertisements that lack a warning is increased when a physician
writes a prescription without having either the package or its insert at hand and
the patient obtains the drug from a pharmacist." Id. at 1364. See also Incollingo v.
Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 221 (Pa. 1971).
71. By way of an example, the exception to the rule that the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's duty to warn is satisfied by a timely and adequate warning to the
medical community. See Davis, 399 F.2d at 131. The role of the physician as the
learned intermediary between the seller and the individual patient is recognized
where the seller has no reason to believe that the pharmaceutical will be adminis-
tered in a setting in which there will be the typical, binary, physician-patient rela-
tionship, i.e., where the pharmaceutical is to be administered by means of mass
immunization. See id.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1998).
See Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334 (N.D.W. Va. 1995). Pumphrey
involved a medical device designed for repeated delivery of pharmaceuticals to the
patient's blood system. See id. Plaintiffs claim was that the manufacturer failed
to provide adequate warnings as to the risks of a "pinch-off syndrome" associated
with the use of the port and catheter. See id. at 336, 339. The court held that (1)
under West Virginia law, the manufacturer had a duty to warn the patient's physi-
cians of potential complications, but did not have a duty to warn the patient di-
330
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prescription drugs need only warn the prescribing physician
and not the patient of risks and contraindications associated
with a prescription drug."73 The California Supreme Court has
explained that defining the manufacturer's duty as an obliga-
tion to provide pertinent cautionary information to the appro-
priate health care community is supported by a
characterization of the "consumer expectation" standard of
§ 402A as meaning "a patient's expectations regarding the ef-
fects of such a drug [as] related to him by his physician, to
whom the manufacturer directs the warnings regarding the
drug's properties." 74 While the Second Restatement did not ad-
dress in either its black letter or its commentary any rarified
rule for warnings as related to prescription products, courts fol-
lowing Restatement Second of Torts § 402A adopted the
"learned intermediary" rule, and the Products Liability Restate-
ment has rendered it in the black letter.
This general rule that the person to be warned is the pre-
scribing physician or other health care professional has been
followed in a large number of cases. 75 In McEwen v. Ortho
rectly; and (2) the manufacturer's warnings to the physicians was adequate. See
id. at 339.
A leading early decision reaching this conclusion is Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cor-
nish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966), in which the court stated: "[I]n this case we
are dealing with a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item. In such
a case, the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the purchaser and
the manufacturer." Sterling Drug, 370 F.2d at 85.
73. Nasios v. Pennwalt Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 12,479, 37,047 (D. Md.
1990) (applying Maryland law to action brought by patient who suffered partial
paralysis following injection of anesthetic in the subarachnoid space of the spinal
column). See, e.g., Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000). The court in Morgan acknowledged that:
According to this [learned intermediary] doctrine, the manufacturer of a
prescription drug has a duty to adequately warn the prescribing physician of
the drug's dangers. The physician, relying on his medical training, experi-
ence, and knowledge of the individual patient, then chooses the type and
quantity of the drug to be prescribed. The physician assumes the duty to
warn the patient of the dangers associated with a particular prescribed
drug.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (relying upon Rolen v. Burroughs Wellcome Co.,
856 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
74. Brown, 751 P.2d at 477 (citations omitted).
75. See, e.g., Walker v. Merck & Co., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga.
1986) (learned intermediary doctrine applied). See also Buckner v. Allergan
Pharm., Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). ("[The] manufacturer
of a dangerous commodity ... does have a duty to warn[,] but when the commodity
19
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Pharmaceuticals Corp.,76 the court simply stated: "[i]t is well
settled that the manufacturer of ethical drugs bears the duty of
making timely and adequate warnings to the medical profession
of any dangerous side effects produced by its drugs[." 77 Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,78 also followed the general
rule, with respect to most prescription drugs, that although the
failure to warn adequately of the inherent dangers of the drug
may give rise to the manufacturer's liability to the ultimate
user, the target of the warning is not the patient but rather the
physician or other equivalently positioned health care pro-
vider.79 The court stated that a proper warning by a manufac-
turer of a prescription drug communicates risks associated with
the uses of the product, as are known or reasonably knowable to
experts in the field during the period in which the product is
used, and need only be directed at physicians-not to patients
who are the ultimate "users."80
Applying a harmonious analysis, in Leibowitz v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,81 the court could not conclude, as a mat-
ter of law, that the insert on the package of contraceptive pills
was misleading or inadequate. In that case, the insert cau-
tioned against prescribing the pills to patients having recent
cases of thrombophlebitis, and the warning stated that there
were cases of thrombophlebitis reported from the use of the
pills, and that there were studies being conducted into the
causal connection, but that no evidence had established such a
connection.8 2
is a prescription drug ... this duty to warn is fulfilled by an adequate warning
given to those members of the medical community lawfully authorized to prescribe,
dispense, and administer drugs.").
76. 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974).
77. Id. at 528.
78. 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
79. See id at 548. Cf Hasler v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1262, 1268-69
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (dispenser of a swine flu injection did not adequately warn the
patient of the risks involved, and the consent form did not adequately advise the
patient).
80. See Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 548.
81. 307 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); but see generally Teresa Moran
Schwartz, Consumer Warnings for Oral Contraceptives: A New Exception to the
Prescription Drug Rule, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 241 (1986).
82. See Leibowitz, 307 A.2d at 457.
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With respect to vaccines, a manufacturer's duty to warn ex-
tends to the health care professional performing the inocula-
tion, whose responsibility it is then to inform the patient of the
risks inherent in its use.8 3 In White v. Wyeth Laboratories4 and
Niemiera by Niemiera v. Schneider,85 plaintiffs were infants
who suffered brain damage and other injuries after being in-
jected with the DPT vaccine. In each case, the court held that
the 'learned intermediary' doctrine applied and that liability did
not extend to the manufacturer.8 6 In some circumstances, medi-
cal professionals other than physicians may be considered
"learned intermediaries" for the purposes of this interpretation
of the manufacturer's informational obligations. For example,
the rule has been found applicable to nurses.8 7
Quite apart from the considerations afoot in application of
the "learned intermediary" doctrine, the defendant manufac-
turer should prevail on a claim of failure to warn adequately
where it can show that the prescribing physician, by virtue of
defendant's product information or otherwise, was aware of the
risks involved in prescribing the drug.88 The court reached the
same conclusion in Wooten v. Johnson and Johnson Products,
83. See White, 533 N.E.2d at 748; see also Niemiera by Niemiera v. Schneider,
555 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 1989).
84. 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988).
85. 555 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 1989).
86. Compare White, 533 N.E.2d at 748 with Niemiera by Niemiera v. Schnei-
der, 555 A.2d 1112 (N.J. 1989).
87. See Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (In
context of measles epidemic, nurse's administration of vaccination to students;
claimants suffered subacute sclerosis panencephalitis, a disease of the central ner-
vous system; held that it is a triable issue of fact whether manufacturer of measles,
mumps and rubella vaccination adequately warned the nurse).
88. See, e.g., Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Conn. 1978).
Whereby the manufacturer's failure to adequately warn of the risk of cerebral
thrombosis for patients prescribed oral contraceptives. See id. Upon the manufac-
turer's submission of PDR excerpts and the affidavit of the prescribing physician
affirming his familiarity with the pertinent risk through several sources, including
PDR, the court granted summary judgment, stating:
[Tihere is no issue of material fact that the defendant warned the medical
profession and the prescribing doctor prior to the plaintiffs use of the risk of
cerebral thrombosis associated with the use of [the drug]. Even were the
warning found to be inadequate as to the medical profession as a whole, it is
clear that the physician who prescribed [the drug] for the plaintiff had been
adequately warned of the increased risk of thromboembolic disease associ-




Inc.,8 9 an action arising out of decedent's fatal allergic reaction
to several drugs, including defendant's Zomax. In that action,
the prescribing physician testified that through the drug's pack-
age inserts, the PDR (Physician's Desk Reference), his training
and experience, and through various other sources, he under-
stood the risks of each of the medications prescribed to the dece-
dent.90 On this basis, the court granted summary judgment for
defendant, finding that, as a matter of law, the pharmaceutical
company had fulfilled its duty to warn the administering physi-
cian of the risks associated with use of the product.91
The court in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman92
found that the duty to warn extends only to the medical profes-
sion and not to the ultimate users. It reasoned that a contra-
ceptive is a complex "esoteric medicine available only through
prescription by physicians who act as 'learned intermediaries'
in balancing benefits and risks."93 It is worth noting that the
same "learned intermediary" approach to a manufacturer's in-
formational obligations has been applied to manufacturers of
medical devices. 94 For example, in Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co.,
the Washington Supreme Court found that the manufacturer of
the intrauterine device, Dalkon Shield, adequately fulfilled its
duty to warn by providing a warning solely to the medical com-
munity. 95 In contrast with Terhune, the growing phenomenon
of direct advertising to patients prompted the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,96 a suit
brought against the manufacturer of surgically implantable
contraceptive capsule, to hold that the "learned intermediary"
doctrine ought not apply to a manufacturer's informational obli-
gations when its marketing effort is targeted to the consumers
themselves.
89. 635 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
90. See id. at 802.
91. See id. at 804. See also Cobb v. Syntax Labs., Inc., 444 So.2d 203, 206 (La.
Ct. App. 1983).
92. 388 N.E.2d 541. See generally Rosalind M. Kendellen, The Food and Drug
Administration Retreats From Patient Package Inserts for Prescription Drugs, 40
FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 172, 184 (1985).
93. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 549.
94. See Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978).
95. See id. For a discussion on a seller's warning obligations under the Re-
statement Second and Third, see OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, § 23:4.
96. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
334 [Vol. 21:313
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/1
2001] THE ENDURING PARADOX 335
In some jurisdictions an exception to the "learned interme-
diary" rule has been recognized when vaccines are administered
in a mass inoculation setting.97 One of the earliest characteri-
zations of the mass immunization exception to the "learned in-
termediary" rule was pronounced in the decision of Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.98 That case arose from an illness and
injury suffered by an adult recipient of the manufacturer's Type
III polio vaccine at a mass immunization clinic.99 Within thirty
days of the vaccination, Davis suffered symptoms of polio and
was eventually paralyzed from the waist down. 100 The manu-
facturer argued that it had satisfied its informational duties by
a general dissemination of pertinent information to members of
the medical profession, and indeed the court confirmed that,
"[o]rdinarily in the case of prescription drugs warning to the
prescribing physician is sufficient. " 10 1 However, the court ex-
plained that where the drug is administered in circumstances
not permitting the ordinary patient-physician relation, a setting
that does not allow "an individualized balancing" of the risks
involved by a physician, the manufacturer does not meet its
duty to warn simply by providing information to the medical
community. 0 2 The court suggested that such information
might be effectively conveyed to the clinical patient by means of
97. See, e.g., Davis, 399 F.2d at 130-31.
98. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
99. See id at 122.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 130 (citing Sterling, 370 F.2d at 82).
The Davis court added its observation that in such cases:
[T]he choice involved is essentially a medical one involving an assessment of
medical risks in the light of the physician's knowledge of his patient's needs
and susceptibilities. Further, it is difficult under such circumstances for the
manufacturer, by label or direct communication, to reach the consumer with
a warning. A warning to the medical profession is in such cases the only
effective means by which a warning could help the patient ....
Davis, 399 F.2d at 130.
102. See id. at 131.
The decision (that on balance and in the public interest the personal risk to
the individual was worth taking) may well have been that of the medical
society and not that of appellee. But just as the responsibility for choice is
not one that the manufacturer can assume for all comers, neither is it one
that he can allow his immediate purchaser to assume.
23
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"advertisements, posters, releases to be read and signed by re-
cipients of the vaccine, or oral warnings ...."103
The lead of Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories was followed in
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories. 104 In Reyes, an infant was taken
by her mother to a polio immunization clinic, where she was
administered an oral polio vaccine by an eyedropper. 10 5 No cau-
tionary information was given to plaintiffs mother, although
the mother was requested to, and in fact, executed a release. 06
The child, thereafter, was paralyzed from the waist down as a
result of paralytic poliomyelitis. 0 7 Thus, where a titularly pre-
scription drug was marketed by the manufacturer for adminis-
tration in "assembly line fashion," precluding the ability of a
physician to offer "individualized medical judgment," the court
found, "Wyeth was under a duty to warn Anita Reyes's parents
of the danger inherent in its vaccine." 08
In the limited context of prescription oral contraceptives,
Massachusetts has countenanced a significant departure from
the "learned intermediary" rule, suggesting that manufacturers
of such products may have a duty to warn the patient-con-
sumer, directly, of possible adverse effects associated with the
drug's use. In distinguishing the role of the intermediary in
prescribing this drug, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reasoned that the consumer of oral contraceptives is more
actively involved in the decision to use the drug, as it requires a
choice between that form of contraception and others.'0 9 Ac-
cordingly, in MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,110 the
state high court held that the manufacturer of oral contracep-
tives had a duty to warn the patient, directly, of any potentially
serious adverse effects of the drug's use."' The duty adopted in
103. Id.
104. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
105. See id at 1270.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1277.
109. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass. 1985).
110. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
111. See id. at 69. Additional reference to the policy rationale and the deci-
sional adherence to the informed intermediary rule may be found in numerous
scholarly writings. See generally Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Pre-




MacDonald has gained no significant adherence in other
jurisdictions." 2
Of further significance to the warning obligations imposed
upon manufacturers of injectable or oral contraceptives, impor-
tant regulatory exceptions to the "learned intermediary" rule
also require attention. The FDA has mandated that the phar-
maceutical manufacturer do more than provide warnings to the
medical profession, as the informed intermediary between the
manufacturer and the recipient of the drug. With specific re-
spect to certain injectable contraceptives and oral contracep-
tives, the FDA has issued detailed requirements for the
warnings and precautions to accompany the product actually
received by the user. 113 The FDA has promulgated comparable
warnings standards for intrauterine devices."14
B. Products Liability Restatement § 6(d)(1) and (2)
Products Liability Restatement § 6(d)(1) and (2) separates
seller warning obligations into two settings: (1) the prescription
of a drug or medical device by means of the conventional health
care provider-patient relationship; and (2) other circumstances
in which the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
the health care provider may not be circumstanced in relation
to the patient "to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with
the instructions or warnings." 15 In the former situation, the
Products Liability Restatement preserves the "learned interme-
diary" rule that permits the seller to discharge its warnings du-
ties by providing adequate warnings or instructions to the
appropriate health-care providers. In the latter setting, identi-
fied to date in connection with (1) mass immunizations; (2) a
limited number of direct manufacturer to consumer advertising
scenarios; and (3) certain limited physician-patient contact sce-
112. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D.D.C.
1991). See generally James L. Rigelhaupt Jr., Annotation, Contraceptive Causing
Injury or Death: Liability of Manufacturer, 70 A.L.R.3d 315, § 6 (1976).
113. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2000) which states that the package inserts for
oral contraceptives must contain specific cautionary and directory narratives
under subheadings such as: "Who Should Not Take (Name of Drug)"; "How (Name
of Drug) Prevents Pregnancy"; "Important Risks"; "Common Adverse Reactions";
"Other Considerations"; and "Precautions You Should Take." See id.
114. See id.




narios (such as prescriptions for birth control medicines), the
manufacturer may have an obligation to provide warning and
instruction information directly to the patient.116 It is perceived
that Section 6(d)(2) notes an important exception to the
"learned intermediary" rule. Essentially, the Products Liability
Restatement proposes that courts follow the limited decisional
law suggesting that a pharmaceutical manufacturer may have a
duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions directly to
the patient "when the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to re-
duce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings."117 Products Liability Restatement § 6(d)(2) comment
e provides one conspicuous example of such a duty to provide
direct warnings: that of mass immunizations."18
Comment e notes also that the FDA in some circumstances,
such as the sale of prescription birth control pills, requires that
warning and instruction information be contained in the prod-
uct package. Recognizing the widespread phenomenon of direct
advertising to patients of the attributes of numerous prescrip-
tion products, the American Law Institute concluded that it
should "leav[e] to developing case law" whether other excep-
tions should come to be recognized. 119
Where statutory schemes have established mandatory im-
munization for school-age children, neither the existence of
such programs nor other statutory provisions shielding injured
persons from liability will serve to protect the manufacturer of a
116. See id. § 6(d)(2).
117. Id.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998)
cmt. e (1998).
"Subsection (d)(2) recognizes that direct warnings and instructions to pa-
tients are warranted for drugs that are dispensed to patients without the
personal intervention or evaluation of a health-care provider. An example is
the administration of a vaccine in clinics where mass inoculations are per-
formed. In many such programs, health-care providers are not in a position
to evaluate the risks attendant upon us of the drug or device or to relate
them to patients. When a manufacturer supplies prescription drugs for dis-
tribution in this type of unsupervised environment, if a direct warning to
patients is feasible and can be effective, the law requires measures to that
effect."
Id.





pharmaceutical from potential liability in negligence or strict
liability.120 In these limited circumstances, a prescription drug
manufacturer may be required to provide warnings not only to
the health care provider, but also to a general or target popula-
tion. A prominent example of drugs of this type is the polio vac-
cine, which has been given in mass inoculations to large
numbers of children. 12' Some courts have held that in circum-
stances in which there is no informed intermediary who can
communicate warnings to the recipients of the vaccine, the
manufacturer may need to adopt means of informing patients or
their guardians directly. 122 Givens v. Lederle provides an exam-
ple of the manufacturer's duty to warn the general public when
there is an expectation that the drug will be administered to
large numbers of people without the direct intervention of pre-
scribing physicians. In that case, suit was brought against the
manufacturer by the parents after the mother contracted polio
when the child was given oral polio vaccine by a pediatrician.1
23
There was evidence that the vaccine was administered more in
a manner like that "at a small county health clinic... than by
prescription."1 24 The court ruled that the jury could find the
manufacturer responsible for taking definite steps to warn the
consumer, directly, that exposure to oral polio vaccine could in-
duce an active polio case. 125
As is true of the seller's informational obligation for prod-
ucts other than pharmaceuticals, a manufacturer's conduct may
satisfy a regulatory standard, and yet be inadequate under
state tort law. 26 In Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,127 an
120. See Flood v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 228 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986). With reference to the statutory use of the word "administration" the
court stated that, "[tihe term administration has several meanings. When used
with respect to medicine, it clearly has a meaning close to the one suggested by
appellant-the meting out, or the application, or dosage. None of the dictionary
meanings can be said to include manufacturing." Id. at 703.
121. See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1294; see also Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
122. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1345.
125. See id.
126. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1981) ("com-
pliance with regulatory standards may be admissible on the issue of care[,] but
does not require a jury to find a defendant's conduct reasonable.") and RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 (d)(1)(2) cmt b (recognizing potential "common-law




action arising out of the birth defects of a child whose parents
had used defendant's contraceptive spermicide, the appellate
court commented upon the manufacturer's protestation that the
FDA had decided that no warning was necessary for non-ionic
surfactant spermicides. 128 The court held that the finder of fact
was not required to accept the agency's decision as
conclusive.129
C. The Adequacy of Warnings and Instructions
In pharmaceutical product liability, the manufacturer has
a duty to warn persons who might use, consume or be affected
by use of the drug, of any cognizable risk of injury, or adverse
reaction occasioned thereby. What constitutes a risk requiring
warnings or instructions is the subject of the preceding section.
Where there is a duty to warn, and the manufacturer does give
some warning, plaintiffs claim of failure to warn requires the
factual-legal evaluation of what constitutes an adequate
warning.
The adequacy of the manufacturer's warning is ordinarily a
question for the finder of fact.1 30 The sufficiency of the seller's
discharge of its informational obligation is measured in terms of
whether the cautionary information sufficiently conveys the na-
ture, the scope, and the severity of the risk, together with a
plain statement of how the user may avoid such risks and safely
use the product. 13' If the adequacy issue is determined favora-
bly to the manufacturer, that finding will preclude liability even
where "the plaintiffs use of the drug was, in fact, causally con-
nected to the plaintiffs injury."'132
warnings or instructions, even though the manufacturer complied with govern-
mental standards.").
127. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
128. See id. at 746.
129. See id. ("An FDA determination that a warning is not necessary may be
sufficient for federal regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient for state tort
law purposes.").
130. See Tatum v. Schering Corp., 795 F.2d 925, 927 (11th Cir. 1986); Lawson
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ill. 1976) (warning adequacy central to
determination of unreasonable danger under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A).
131. For a discussion on warnings, see 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, § 9:10.




The necessary warning may be given through any avenue
of communication open between the manufacturer and the phy-
sician. However, advertising in the numerous medical periodi-
cals is obviously one such method on which the drug industry
relies heavily. It is a method rarely used for the transmission of
warnings. In communicating warnings, drug manufacturers
have instead placed their principal reliance on the "package in-
sert." The package insert is precisely what its name suggests: a
paper or pamphlet inserted in the container in which the drug
is marketed. However, what is important here is that it is con-
tained in the package received by the pharmacist or physician,
and not (except in cases where direct warning to the user is re-
quired by the FDA) in the package received by the user when he
has the prescription filled. The package insert is intended to
explain the drug-its chemical structure, its pharmacological
actions and effects, its approved, suggested or recommended
uses, indications for its appropriate use, any contraindications
to that use, and precautions to be taken in its prescription and
usage. Warnings of potential adverse effects are included
among contradictions and precautions.
Further, warnings may be labeled as such by the word
"warning" used in a separate part of the insert. In many cir-
cumstances, the package insert will reach a physician prescrib-
ing the drug, and will often be through the manufacturer's
"detail man" who familiarizes him with its company's products.
Irrespective of any direct or delegated manufacturer communi-
cation with the health-care professional, pertinent product in-
formation is available to the physician in the form of a copy
reproduced verbatim in the Physician's Desk Reference.133 The
PDR is an annual publication, a compendium of information
about all ethical drugs, which reproduces the information from
the package inserts of all of them. The PDR is found in the of-
fices of most United States physicians.
Both the form and content of a prescription pharmaceutical
package insert are subject to approval by the FDA. It may ap-
prove warnings written by the manufacturer or it may require
different or additional warnings. Compliance with FDA re-




quirements is a condition of obtaining its approval of the pack-
age insert, which is a prerequisite of the marketing of the drug.
As the package insert is required to accompany the phar-
maceutical and to contain appropriate warnings, the typical
warning claim before a court focuses upon whether the warn-
ings and instructions were adequate. This means of warning,
when taken in conjunction with the manufacturer's statement
in the PDR, has generally been held to be a suitable mechanism
for informing the health care profession. 34 Significantly, a con-
trary conclusion may be reached where the impact of the manu-
facturer's package insert information is diluted by other
promotional efforts. 135
Once the warning, however communicated, has reached the
physician, there frequently arises a further question as to the
adequacy of its content. The rule has been stated succinctly:
"[it is incumbent upon the manufacturer to bring the warning
home to the doctor[,]" 136 and such a warning should be "suffi-
cient to [apprise] a general practitioner . . . of the dangerous
propensities of the drug."1 37 An "adequate warning" has been
134. See, e.g., Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
135. See Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967).
The court in Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc. concluded:
Where the doctor is inundated with literature and product cards of the vari-
ous manufacturers, as shown here by the facts, a change in the literature or
an additional letter intended to present new information on drugs to the
doctor is insufficient. The most effective method employed by the drug com-
pany in the promotion of new drugs is shown to be the use of detail men;
thus, the Court feels that this would also present the most effective method
of warning the doctor about recent developments in drugs already employed
by the doctor, at no great additional expense. The detail men visit the doc-
tors at frequent intervals and could make an effective oral warning, accom-
panied by literature on the development, that would affirmatively notify the
doctor of side effects such as shown in the facts in this case.
Id.
136. Id. at 163. Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 993 (1964). The Rheingold arti-
cle has been relied upon as authoritative by numerous courts in many scholarly
writings. See, e.g., Martin v. Hacker, 550 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Kearl
v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal. App. 3d 812 (1985) rev'd on other grounds 751 P.2d 470
(1988).
137. Wooderson v. Ortho Pharms. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1058 (Kan. 1984)




defined by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Michael v.
Warner / Chilcott: 138
What is an adequate warning on a drug label? "Adequate" is de-
fined to mean "sufficient for a specific requirement.".. . The word
"sufficient" is defined to mean adequate, enough, equal to the end
proposed, and that which may be necessary to accomplish an ob-
ject[,] it embraces no more than that which, when done, suffices to
accomplish the purpose intended in light of present conditions
and viewed through the eyes of practical and cautious men ....
"Warning" is defined to mean previous notice; caution against
danger. The purpose of a "warning" is to apprise a party of the
existence of danger of which he is not aware to enable him to pro-
tect himself against it .... 139
In Richards v. The Upjohn Co., 140 a New Mexico court of
appeals offered this quite orderly and appropriate protocol:
Five relevant standards concerning the adequacy of warnings
about a dangerous drug are enumerated [in our precedents]: 1.
the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger; 2.
the warning must reasonably communicate the extent or serious-
ness of the harm that could result from a misuse of the drug; 3.
the physical aspects of the warning must be adequate to alert a
reasonably prudent person to the danger; 4. a simple directive
warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the conse-
quences that might result from failing to follow it[;] and. . . 5. the
means to convey the warning must be adequate. 141
D. Inadequate Warnings or Instructions and Causation
As is true for all warnings liability, the plaintiff asserting a
drug-related warnings claim must show that the manufac-
turer's failure to accompany its product with adequate warn-
ings or instructions proximately caused the injury.14 2 Comment
j to Restatement Second, Torts § 402A establishes a presump-
tion that a warning, where adequate, would be read and
138. 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
139. Id. at 186-87 (affirming denial of motion for summary judgment for non-
prescription drug manufacturers of "Sinutab.")
140. 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
141. Id. at 1196.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
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heeded. 143 The presumption is two-edged. It aids the defendant
manufacturer where an arguably adequate warning has been
given. However, where an inadequate warning has been given,
or no warning has been given at all, the presumption works in
the favor of the plaintiff. In the latter situation, an application
of comment j raises "a rebuttable presumption beneficial to the
plaintiff, that the failure to adequately warn was a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs ingestion of the drug" and of the conse-
quent injury.144
Upon plaintiffs proof of injury and the presence of an inad-
equate warning, or the absence of a warning in the first in-
stance, most courts have agreed that there arises either a
permissible inference or a rebuttable presumption that had an
adequate warning been given, plaintiffs physician would have
altered the course of treatment appropriately. This rebuttable
presumption, where adopted by state law, may permit a plain-
tiff to satisfy its prima facie showing of causation even where
plaintiff has produced no direct evidence of, or testimony, con-
cerning the adequacy of the warnings or the prospect of differ-
ent treatment by plaintiffs physician. 145 The pharmaceutical
manufacturer may seek to overcome this presumption by show-
ing that even if a product's warning was inadequate, the ad-
143. See id.; see also Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.
1974) ("In the absence of evidence rebutting the presumption, a jury finding that
the defendant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiffs injury would be
sufficient to hold him liable.").
144. See Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 547.
The rationale for this presumption is given by the court in Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966):
If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect in some
patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side
effect, there is an excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.
This is particularly true if the injury takes place slowly, as is the case with
the injury in question here.
Id. at 85.
145. Id. Availability of this presumption does not alter, from the plaintiffs
prospective, the attraction of evidence that a fuller warning would have altered the
prescribing physician's administration of the pharmaceutical or other prescription
product. See, e.g., Batteast v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 560 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1990) (evi-
dence in action arising from drug overdose from administration of aminophylline
suppositories raised jury issue as to warning inadequacy and causation; evidence
indicated that the prescribing physician would have either declined to prescribe
the drug or more closely monitored its administration had the manufacturer's
package insert contained more detailed warnings and instructions).
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss2/1
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ministering health professional was cognizant of the product's
risks, and thus the alleged warning inadequacy was not the pro-
ducing cause of the patient's injuries. 146
Defendant's evidentiary burden in rebutting this presump-
tion has been held unsatisfied by a prescribing physician's testi-
mony that he had no duty to disclose to a patient the known
risks of administration of the Sabin oral polio vaccine. 147 In
contrast and illustrative of the operation of the presumption of
comment j in the favor of the manufacturer, is the holding in
Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co. 148 In that case, an action was brought
by a woman alleging that she suffered a stroke and partial inca-
pacitation due to her use of defendant's birth control pill. 49 De-
fendant adduced proof that the plaintiff had failed to inform the
prescribing physician of her prior history of toxemia associated
with pregnancy, and suggested that even had the defendant's
warnings been in the form proposed by plaintiff, plaintiffs phy-
sician "could not have related those warnings to [plaintiffs]
case." 50 The court determined that a jury could, therefore, con-
clude that an adequate warning by the defendant would have
made no difference in the decision by plaintiffs physician as to
either the prescription or the post-prescription monitoring ap-
propriate for plaintiff, leaving plaintiffs cause of action fatally
lacking in proof of proximate cause. 151
A pharmaceutical manufacturer's arguably inadequate
warning or instructions do not proximately cause plaintiffs in-
jury where the prescribing physician knows of the relevant
146. See Stewart v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App.
1989) (anesthesiologist who selected anesthetic drug Sufenta, aware of risks of
renarcotization).
147. See Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F. Supp. 1473, 1475 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
148. 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981).
149. See id. at 834.
150. Id. at 838.
151. See id. "Where, as here, an adequate warning would have made no dif-
ference in the physician's decision as to whether to prescribe a drug or as to
whether to monitor the patient thereafter, the presumption established by com-
ment j is rebutted, and the required element of proximate cause between the warn-
ing and ingestion of the drug is lacking." Id. at 838-39. See also Douglas v.
Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 829, 831 (Wash. 1968) (en banc) (plaintiffs physician, rely-





product risks and fails to inform the patient.152 Consistently, a
failure to warn claim may fail where there is proof that plain-
tiffs physician proceeded to administer a pharmaceutical,
knowing that the patient had exhibited symptoms that the
manufacturer advises commend discontinuation. 153 Also note-
worthy is the case of Tunnell v. Parke, Davis & Co. 154 In that
case, the court found that a drug manufacturer's failure to di-
rectly warn the prescribing physician was not a basis for liabil-
ity because the prescribing physician's own testimony revealed
that he had personal knowledge of the characteristics of Chloro-
mycetin, and there was no evidence showing that the manufac-
turer failed to communicate the possible effects to the medical
profession, generally. 155
A New York appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial
of summary judgment in a products liability case where the
plaintiff, an infant, was born with permanent brain damage al-
legedly resulting from the mother's treatment with the drug
Decumard during pregnancy. Even though the plaintiff and the
court acknowledged that the package insert, which warned that
the drug was contraindicated for pregnant women, was, itself, a
proper package insert;15 6 there is authority for the proposition
that a question of fact still remained as to the adequacy of the
manufacturer's efforts to bring the knowledge of the hazards of
the drug to the attention of the medical profession. The court
mentioned that the manufacturer had an obligation to keep
152. See Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989) ("[I]t
makes no difference that the mother testified that Dr. Greenwald did not warn her
of the danger of taking Accutane while she was pregnant. While this would pre-
sent a factual issue in a claim against the doctor, the drug manufacturer could not
be penalized for the failure of the doctor to impart knowledge concerning the dan-
gers of the drug of which the doctor had been warned and was aware.").
153. See, e.g., White v. Slidell Mem. Hosp. & Med. Center, No. Civ. 89-2691,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9933 at *3 (E.D. La. July 26, 1990) (manufacturer of Bac-
trim D.S. not liable in death of patient who allegedly suffered toxic epidermal
necrolysis from taking drug for urinary tract problems; physician continued to pre-
scribe medicine notwithstanding package insert recommending discontinuation
should patient exhibit skin rash).
154. Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8039 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). But see Schwartz,
supra note 81, at 241.
155. Tunnell v. Parke, Davis & Co., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8039 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1977).





abreast of knowledge of its product as gained through research,
adverse reaction reports, scientific literature, and other availa-
ble methods. 157 Additionally, the manufacturer must "take such
steps as are reasonably necessary to bring that knowledge to
the attention of the medical profession . . . [and] [tihe greater
the potential hazard of the drug, the more extensive must be
the manufacturer's efforts to make that hazard known[."158
When a manufacturer of a potentially dangerous drug fails
to change a warning that it knows is widely ignored, a jury may
infer that the warning is inadequate. In Salmon v. Parke, Da-
vis & Co.,159 the court ruled that compliance with federal laws
did not automatically excuse a manufacturer from liability. The
manufacturer had given physicians a calendar advertising the
drug chloramphenicol, along with a free sample that contained
a warning about the drug. The court reasoned that the calen-
dar might remain on the physician's desk as a constant re-
minder to prescribe the drug, long after the sample and the
memory of its warning were gone. Therefore, this over-promo-
tion could diminish the effectiveness of a warning that would be
adequate in all other respects. 60 The court also announced that
a jury could infer unreasonableness on the part of a manufac-
turer who insisted on using the word "should" instead of the
FDA suggested "must" when warning physicians to take certain
precautions.161
The court in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales,162 held that the
misuse of a drug with an inadequate warning could be consid-
ered foreseeable, and therefore not a bar to recovery against the
manufacturer. 163 In foreign markets, the choice of language for
a warning may prove crucial, although the court in Pierluisi v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc, 64 found that because the Puerto Rican
physician read and understood the English language, failure to
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
160. See id. at 1362.
161. See id. at 1363.
162. 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976).
163. See id.




include a Spanish translation of the manufacturer's warning
was not a proximate cause of the alleged injury.165
E. Intergenerational Harm
Chemical compounds and other toxic substances increas-
ingly are claimed to have generated chromosomal alteration
that may cause genetic defects in subsequent generations. If
the child or grandchild of a person exposed to some toxin is born
with a withered arm, or perhaps suffers a handicap much more
severe, what ought be the potential of a tort action against the
manufacturer that manufactured the product one or more gen-
erations before?
A leading expression of the view that recovery ought to be
available only to the first generation or immediate offspring
that was, in fact, exposed to the chemical in utero is Grover v.
Eli Lilly & Co.' 6 6 In Grover, a federal trial court certified this
issue to the Ohio Supreme Court in the context of a grandchild's
claim, through his representatives. 67 The claim, in Grover, was
that the grandchild's severe birth defects were caused by de-
fects in the mother's reproductive system, which were earlier
caused by the grandmother's ingestion of the drug DES. 168 The
Ohio Supreme Court noted that some courts in other jurisdic-
tions, on similar but distinguishable facts, had not permitted
actions to proceed for such "pre-conception" torts. 169 However,
the Ohio high court quoted Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. 170
for the proposition that "[a]n actor does not have a duty to a
particular plaintiff unless the risk to that plaintiff is within the
actor's 'range of apprehension'."' 71 In finding no cause of action
inuring to the grandchild, the Grover court explained:
165. See id. at 691.
166. 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992).
167. See id. at 697.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 698 (citing Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y.
1981)). For an example of a court that did not permit "pre-conception" torts, see
Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (mother's physicians
allegedly failed to inoculate mother with rubella vaccine prior to child's
conception).
170. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
171. Grover, 591 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162




When a pharmaceutical company prescribes drugs to a woman,
the company, under ordinary circumstances, does not have a duty
to her daughter's infant who will be conceived twenty-eight years
later .... Because of the remoteness in time and causation, we
hold that [the grandchild] does not have an independent cause of
action, and answer the district court's question in the negative. A
pharmaceutical company's liability for the distribution or manu-
facturer of a defective prescription drug does not extend to per-
sons who were never exposed to the drug, either directly or in
utero.17
2
F. Liability of Pharmacists and Pharmaceutical Distributors
With respect to prescription pharmaceuticals, the pharma-
cist is considered a seller at retail. As such, he is generally vul-
nerable to all of the liabilities imposed by law on retail sellers.
However, the traditional principles governing a non-manufac-
turing pharmaceutical seller's potential liability have, appropri-
ately, been affected by two imposing policy imperatives: (1) the
pharmacist is an essential and professional part of the delivery
system of pharmaceuticals to countless persons;173 and (2) this
retailer sells products that if misused or inappropriate to a pa-
tient's therapy can have serious or even deadly effects. 174
For claims brought by a patient alleging pharmacist negli-
gence in the sale of a prescription product, the pharmacist's
duty of care is properly a function of the magnitude of the risk
to patient. 175 As is appropriate, the pharmacist is held to a
standard of "the highest degree of prudence in filling a prescrip-
tion."176 By law and by custom, however, it is the physician, not
172. Grover, 591 N.E.2d at 700-01.
173. See Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 325 (Ala. 2000)
(noting "inextricable" role of pharmacist in health care delivery system).
174. See generally Steven W. Huang, Redefining Pharmacists' Legal Responsi-
bilities, 24 Am. J.L. & MED. 417 (1998); see also David J. Marchitelli, Annotation.,
Liability of Pharmacist Who Accurately Fills Prescription for Harm Resulting to
User, 44 A.L.R. 5th 393 (1996).
175. Morgan v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 469 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding pharmacist did not have a general duty to warn patient of potential ad-
verse reactions to prescription drugs absent evidence of any special
circumstances).
176. Id. at 464. See also Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Druggist's Civil Li-
ability for Injuries Sustained as a Result of Negligence in Incorrectly Filling Drug
Prescriptions, 3 A.L.R. 4th 270 (1981), 32 AM. JUR. Trials 375, § 3 (1985). See also




the pharmacist, who is responsible for selecting and prescribing
the drug. Therefore, the pharmacist generally has no liability
when he dispenses the correct drug in the prescribed dosage.
This is true whether the claim against him is based on negli-
gence, implied warranty, or strict liability under Restatement
Second, Torts § 402A. 177 The limiting phrase "in general" is nec-
essary because some courts have identified exceptions to the
rule in special circumstances. An example of such a circum-
stance is when the pharmacist fills a prescription that he
should know will create health risks for a patient, based upon
the pharmacist's knowledge of "a particular patient's unique
medical problems or where a pharmacist fills two incompatible
prescriptions. "178
As to the specific issue of whether the pharmacist does not
have a freestanding obligation to convey adequate warnings to
the patient, the overwhelming authority illustrates that he does
not. 179 A representative decision so holding is Stebbins v. Con-
cord Wrigley Drugs, Inc.,18 0 which involved a claim that the
pharmacist who filled a prescription for the antidepressant
Tofranil failed to advise the patient of the prescription's side
effects, which include drowsiness.' 8 ' The patient's automobile
was subsequently involved in a collision with that of plaintiff.182
Finding for the pharmacist, the state appellate court wrote, "[A]
pharmacist has no duty to warn the patient of possible side ef-
fects of a prescribed medication where the prescription is proper
on its face and neither the physician nor the manufacturer has
pharmacy delivered capsules to a home, it was not foreseeable that minor would
attempt suicide).
177. Compare Martin v. Hacker, 550 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Re-
serpine distributor's dissemination of dispensing information along with pharma-
ceutical insufficient to raise question of fact as to representation of product as its
own; held: no liability for suicide of user) with McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174
So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Bichler v. Willing, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977); Batiste v. Ameri-
can Home Products Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (holding pharma-
cists not liable for plaintiffs' injuries allegedly suffered because of a prescription
drug).
178. Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 388 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987).
179. See id. at 387-88.
180. 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).





required that any warning be given to the patient by the
pharmacist." 8 3
One rationale for limiting patient redress against the phar-
macist is that to create incentives for the pharmacist to second-
guess the physician would carry with it a real danger of blur-
ring the lines that define the latter's responsibilities to his pa-
tient. As summarized by one court:
The imposition of a generalized duty to warn would unnecessarily
interfere with the relationship between physician and patient by
compelling pharmacists seeking to escape liability to question the
propriety of every prescription they fill. Furthermore, a patient
faced with an overwhelming number of warnings from his or her
pharmacist may decide not to take a medication prescribed by a
physician, who has greater access to and knowledge of the pa-
tient's complete medical history and current condition than the
pharmacist.184
When a pharmacist voluntarily chooses to advise a patient
of some risks associated with a pharmaceutical, he should not
categorically be considered to have waived the limited protec-
tion of the "learned intermediary" rule and assumed the duty to
inform the patient of all such risks. An Illinois appeals court so
held in Kasin v. Osco Drug, Inc.'8 5 In that case, a pharmacy
customer (a kidney donee) and his brother (the kidney donor)
claimed that the pharmacist should be liable for having advised
the donee of some of the side effects of taking the drug Daypro,
but failing to warn of others, such as the risk of kidney fail-
ure.18 6 On the facts before it, the appellate court found that the
druggist's limited consultation with the customer did not trig-
ger an omnibus obligation to warn of the entire spectrum of the
drug's potential side effects. 8 7 The court cautioned, however,
that under the doctrine of "voluntary undertaking"88 a different
conclusion might be reached if the nature and breadth of the
pharmacist's words or actions were such as to reasonably invite
183. Id. at 387-88. Accord Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557,
561 (Ill. 1992).
184. Morgan, 30 S.W.3d at 467.
185. 728 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
186. See id. at 77-78.
187. See id. at 80.




the customer's reliance upon the correctness and the continua-
tion of the pharmacist's counseling.18 9
The general rule that the pharmacist is not liable if he dis-
penses the correct drug in the prescribed dosage was followed in
Lemire v. Garrard Drugs. 90 In that case, a products liability
action was brought against a druggist because defendant's
predecessor had sold the drug Diethylstibestrol (DES) to the
plaintiffs mother for use during the pregnancy.' 9' Plaintiff
claimed that the in utero exposure to the Diethylstilbestrol
caused cervical cancer. 192 Complementary authority has pre-
cluded a claim against a pharmacy where there has been "no
allegation that the pharmacy did any compounding or changed
the drug in any way after receiving it from the manufacturer,"
or "substituted a different brand or generic version for the
brand prescribed," or "exercised any independent discretion,
skill, or knowledge in filling the prescription." 93
Other authority, however, disfavors application of the ordi-
nary remedies against product sellers to pharmacists and, in-
stead, characterizes the pharmacist as a provider of services.
An influential expression of this position was taken by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Incor-
porated.94 This was an action in which the plaintiff, the
daughter of a woman who had been prescribed DES, sought to
impose strict liability upon the pharmacist who had sold the
drug and upon the manufacturer who had manufactured it. 195
The California court disagreed with plaintiffs argument that
tort liability for pharmacists should not differ from that applied
to retailers, to whom strict products liability had long been ap-
189. Kasin, 728 N.E.2d at 80 (interpreting Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605
N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992)).
190. 291 N.W.2d 103 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); see also Makripodis v. Merrell-
Dow Pharm., Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("[A] retail pharmacist
is not required to provide to the patient-consumer such warnings as are required to
be provided to physicians by the manufacturers of prescription drugs.").
191. See Lemire, 291 N.W.2d at 104.
192. See id.
193. In re Raynor v. Richardson Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 246 (D.D.C.
1986) (finding of no liability for pharmacy justified additionally on policy ground
that contrary conclusion imposing duty would require the pharmacist to substitute
its judgment for the prescribing physician).





plied. 196 The Court observed that under California law, phar-
macists were recognized as professionals. 197 As such, the court
concluded that the pharmacist's activity in the filling of a pre-
scription executed by another, for a product manufactured by
another, should be described as the provision of a service and
not the sale of a product.198
The pharmacist should not be liable, pursuant to any im-
plied warranty of merchantability claim, if he dispenses the
drug as prescribed, in kind and dosage. 199 Express warranties
by the pharmacist are rarely made, and, even if made, are not
likely to be the factors relied on by the customer who is filling a
prescription ordered by his doctor. It is not usually the drug-
gist's skill and judgment in selection that is relied on, and thus
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is not
made. There may, however, be a foundation for liability in the
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability where the
drug is prescribed, but of improper quality, due to deterioration
in storage or otherwise.
V. Defenses-Generally
Where the physician's or the patient's negligence or as-
sumption of the risk is of such an unforeseeable nature as to be
considered a superseding cause, the culpable conduct of the
pharmaceutical manufacturer may no longer be determined to
196. See id.
197. See id. at 251-52.
198. Murphy, 710 P.2d at 252 discussed in Gary T. Walker, The Expanding
Applicability of Strict Liability Principles: How is a "Product" Defined?, 22 Tort &
Ins. L.J. 1, 8 (1986). For a discussion, see Kohl v. American Home Products Corp.,
78 F. Supp. 2d. 885, 894 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Some courts
had held that pharmacies cannot be held strictly liable for dispensing a prescrip-
tion drug. This conclusion is typically reached in one of two ways. First, some
courts rely on the learned intermediary doctrine to reject the application of strict
liability to pharmacists or pharmacies. Other courts follow the path suggested by
the manufacturer defendants and draw a distinction between service providers
and providers of products. See Kohl, 78 F. Supp. at 894. (citing Raynor v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 246-47 (D.D.C. 1986) (application of learned
intermediary doctrine to find no pharmacist liability); see also Murphy v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 251 (Cal. 1985) (strict products liability inappli-
cable as pharmacist "is engaged in a hybrid enterprise, combining the performance
of services and the sale of prescription drugs"); Zichichi, 528 A.2d at 807 (finding
service providers not strictly liable).




be the efficient contributing cause to the injury or harm.200
Thus, for example, if a physician decides to administer a phar-
maceutical and ignores the risks explained by the manufac-
turer, he may be considered the intervening, independent, and
sole proximate cause of the patient's injuries. 201
Where the conduct of the patient constitutes negligence or
an assumption of the risk of such an unforeseeable nature as to
be considered a superseding cause, the culpable conduct of the
pharmaceutical manufacturer may no longer be considered the
efficient contributing cause to the injury or harm.20 2 For exam-
ple, in Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,203 the court per-
mitted the defendant manufacturer to go to the jury with its
argument that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
purchasing and using defendant's contraceptives without a pre-
scription.20 4 The legal standard for user conduct employed by
that court was whether the plaintiff "knew or should have
known about the dangers inherent in the drug with regard to
injuries such as she has suffered, and in view of those dangers
should have known about the importance of securing a
prescription." 20 5
In multi-defendant prescription drug cases, the different
limitations periods which apply may be different than the ordi-
nary statute of limitation issues in products liability claims.20 6
For example, while a conventional warranty or tort limitation
period may govern a claim against the pharmaceutical manu-
facturer, the law of a particular state may have a separate limi-
tation period for actions against pharmacists where plaintiffs
claim, if proven under state law, sounds in medical
malpractice. 20 7
200. See Taylor v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Mich. 1984);
see also Richards, 625 P.2d at 1196-97.
201. See Formella v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 300 N.W.2d 356, 358 (Iowa 1980).
202. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp. 637 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980).
203. 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980).
204. See id. at 94.
205. Id.
206. For a discussion on the limitation of actions, see OWEN ET AL., supra note
7, § 31.
207. See, e.g., Robinson v. Williamson, 537 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (ap-
plying two-year "action for medical malpractice" limitation period to claim against




A. Physician or Pharmacist Negligence
The failure of the prescribing physician or the pharmacist
to discharge his professional duty of care to the patient may,
where such failure constitutes the producing cause of the plain-
tiffs harm, generally operate to relieve the pharmaceutical
manufacturer of liability. Where such substandard behavior on
the part of the physician or the pharmacist is merely a joint
cause of the injury (irrespective of whether the pharmacist, the
physician, or both, are party defendants to the suit) their con-
duct may be properly considered relevant to the issues of com-
parative fault, apportionment, contribution, or indemnity. 20
The manufacturer may escape liability if it can show (1)
that it provided an adequate warning to the prescribing physi-
cian, (2) the physician was aware of the risks associated with
the use of the drug, and (3) he or she nevertheless prescribed
the drug without providing an adequate warning. 20 9 For exam-
ple, in Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche,210 evidence adduced at trial
demonstrated that plaintiffs physician prescribed the drug Ac-
cutane to plaintiff for severe acne.211 Thereafter, plaintiff, una-
ware of the drug's teratogenic properties, became pregnant and
gave birth to a severely deformed child. 212 The court found the
manufacturer of the drug not liable for wrongful death based
upon evidence that the manufacturer had, in fact, cautioned
prescribing physicians of the drug's possible side effects by
means of a package insert.213 The court held that it was the
physician, as a "learned intermediary," who had the duty to
alert the patient of the contraindications of the drug.21 4
Regarding related effects, where the evidence indicates
that the prescribing medical professional simply failed to read a
demonstrably adequate warning in a package insert or else-
where, the manufacturer should escape liability on the basis of
208. See generally OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, § 15 (Comparative fault), § 24
(Multiple defendants-Joint liability), §25 (Multiple defendants-Contribution
and indemnity).
209. Thomas v. Hoffman-La Roche, 731 F. Supp. 224, 228-30 (N.D. Miss.
1989).








having fulfilled its informational obligation. 215 An example of
such a failure to read an adequate warning is in Schindler v.
Lederle Laboratories.216 In Schindler v. Lederle Laboratories,
the pediatrician did not read an explicit warning contained in a
package insert that cautioned against the inoculation of polio
vaccine in children with depressed immune response mecha-
nisms. 217 On these facts, the pharmaceutical manufacturer
should not be liable for the consequent injury to the child. 218 To
be distinguished are decisions in which a triable issue of fact
exists as to the forseeability that the physician will fail to con-
sult the PDR.21 9 An example of a distinguishable decision is the
New Mexico Court of Appeals in Richards v. The Upjohn Co.220
In that case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment upon identification of a
factual issue as to whether, in the context of prescribing the
drug neomycin sulfate, the physician's omission and resulting
misuse of the pharmaceutical was foreseeable, or whether it
was a superceding cause of the plaintiffs deafness.22'
By way of further example, in Martin v. Hacker,222 suit was
brought against the manufacturer and the distributor of the
drugs hydrochlorothyazide (HCT) and Reserpine, following the
suicide of a patient who had been prescribed both drugs. 223 The
New York appellate court concluded that neither the manufac-
turer nor the distributor were liable, as the respective package
inserts for the drugs had provided adequate warnings to the
medical profession of potential contraindications and circum-
215. See, e.g., Schindler v. Lederle Labs., 725 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (6th Cir.
1983) (finding pharmaceutical manufacturer should not be liable for consequent




218. See id. The warning read, in pertinent part: "Vaccinations should also be
delayed in conditions having a suppressive effect on the immune response mecha-
nism, such as therapy with immune serum globulin, steroids, radiation, cancer
chemotherapeutic agents ... lymphogenous disease, and disgamaglobinemia [.]"
Id. at 1039.
219. See, e.g., Richards, 625 P.2d at 1195.
220. 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
221. See id. at 1198.
222. 586 N.Y.S.2d 407 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).




stances advising discontinuation. 224 Specifically, the package
insert for HCT stated that it might "add to or potentiate the
action of other anti-hypertensive drugs,"225 while the insert for
Reserpine stated that the drug should be discontinued at any
sign of despondence, early morning insomnia, appetite loss, im-
potence or self-deprecation. 226 The insert advised further that
drug-related depression severe enough to result in suicide
might persist some months following discontinuation.227
It has been held that a plaintiff need not produce expert
testimony to prevail in a suit brought against a pharmacist for
misfilling a customer's prescription. The Maine Supreme Court
so held in Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ,228 a suit arising from
a claim that the pharmacist allegedly filed a customer's pre-
scription with the wrong chemotherapy drug.229
1. Allergic or Idiosyncratic Reactions
The pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to warn of unu-
sual reactions to its product requires examination of the
maker's duty to be informed, its nature and its limits. It is no
defense that the manufacturer marketed a drug in ignorance of
its propensity for a particular harm. He has a duty to test his
product adequately for dangers inherent in its use before put-
ting it on the market, and if it is shown that such tests would
have revealed the potential for harm, he will be liable if harm




227. See id. also Ashman v. S.K. & F Labs., 702 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
In Ashman, the plaintiff was taken to the hospital in an unconscious state after
ingesting a combination of Tagamet, an anti-ulcer pill, and Halcion, a sleeping pill.
See id. at 1403. Plaintiff's physician, knowing of the interactive effect of the two
drugs both from a package insert of one of the two drugs and from the Physician's
Desk Reference, nevertheless prescribed them concurrently. See id. In addition,
while plaintiff was unconscious, the physician proceeded to perform a lumbar
puncture which left plaintiff paralyzed. See id. The court held that the manufac-
turer was not liable for plaintiffs injuries upon the showing that not only did
plaintiffs physician function as a learned intermediary but also that plaintiffs pa-
ralysis was not foreseeable. See id. at 1404-05.
228. 748 A.2d 961 (Me. 2000).
229. See id. at 965.
230. See generally Hoffman-La Roche, 731 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989); see
also Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (infant
2001]
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by the foreseeable risk of harm to users in the light of then cur-
rent scientific and medical knowledge. 231 Therefore, the fact
that an adverse effect which gives rise to a lawsuit is the first
known occurrence with use of the drug will not necessarily pre-
vent recovery.232 In addition to the duty to make adequate
tests, the manufacturer has a duty to keep itself informed of
changed or newly available information concerning the effects
of its products.233
While there is no liability for the failure to warn of the alto-
gether unpredictable adverse patient reaction, prevailing au-
thority is clear that the manufacturer will be required to warn
of any known or knowable adverse result that can be predicted
to follow the use of its drug-no matter how small the number
of users to which it can be expected to occur. Liability will lie in
the knowledge, not the number. Courts and commentators
have variously described the range of frequency risk sufficient
to trigger the duty to warn. Dean Prosser suggested that the
manufacturer be "required to take into account allergies com-
mon to a substantial portion of the population."234 Decisional
plaintiff suffered injuries such as mental retardation and seizures proximately
caused by an injection of the drug Quadrigen administered to the infant); Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (plaintiff suffered injuries
to cataracts from taking a drug for lowering blood cholesterol levels).
231. See O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967) (although evi-
dence was found to be sufficient to support finding of a causal connection between
the use of the drug Ka-50 and the small bowel lesion found in appellant, the
Eighth Circuit held that the precautions given by the drug company to the medical
profession at the time the drug was placed on the market were adequate and com-
plied with the duty to warn).
232. See Percival v. American Cyanamid Co., 689 F. Supp. 1060, 1060 (W.D.
Okla. 1987) (recognizing that, under Oklahoma law, the manufacturer of the DPT
vaccine "Tri-Immunol" has a duty to warn only the prescribing physician; held
that the package insert distributed with the vaccine was adequate to warn physi-
cians of the risks). See, e.g., Cofnas v. Tomases, 548 N.Y.S.2d 367, 367 (N.Y. Sup
Ct. 1989) (finding manufacturer of prescription drug Etraform not liable to patient
where the prescribing physician knew of the risks associated with administration
of the drug and the manufacturer had given adequate warnings and instructions).
233. See Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating a man-
ufacturer has a duty to keep abreast of research, adverse reaction reports, and
other scientific literature pertaining to its product); see also McEwen, 528 P.2d at
522 (plaintiff suffered blindness in her right eye and injuries to her left eye due to
defendant's failure to adequately warn the medical profession of the potential dan-
gers of an oral contraceptive).





law defined variously the threshold risk that will trigger a
warning duty, identifying a duty to warn of "an allergic reaction
to a product where the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable
class of persons allergic thereto",235 an "appreciable number",236
a "substantial portion of possible users",237 or a number of fore-
seeable users sufficient to demonstrate reasonably foreseeable
idiosyncrasies. 23
B. Statutes of Limitation
Due to the long latency period of many injuries or diseases
that may be caused by pharmaceuticals, application of statutes
of limitations to drug product cases may present special litiga-
tion issues. Ordinarily a statute of limitations begins to run
when the cause of action accrues, and the cause of action ac-
crues at the point at which the elements necessary to the plain-
tiffs successful claim have all come to exist.239 Usually the last
such element is the injury, and when it occurs, the cause of ac-
tion is complete. 240 But what of the circumstance in which a
person is given prescriptions for a particular drug which is then
ingested over a long period of time, with the ultimate result of
producing injury or death from untoward side effects?
An action against the drug's manufacturer will generally be
one in tort to which the tort statute of limitations will be ap-
plied. Once a causal relation between the drug and the injury is
conceded, it becomes clear that the "injury" may be said to have
[Tihe seller may expect, within some reasonable limits, that the product will
be used by normal persons, and that he will not be held responsible when
some idiosyncrasy peculiar to the plaintiff makes him abnormally sensitive
to a product quite harmless to ordinary people. This must be qualified to
the extent that he is required to take into account allergies common to a
substantial portion of the population. This in turn must be qualified by his
reasonable right to assume that those who have a common allergy-for ex-
ample, to strawberries-will be aware of the fact, and will take measures to
protect themselves, so that a warning on the label may be all that is re-
quired of him.
Id.
235. Howard v. Avon Prods., Inc., 395 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Colo. 1964).
236. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 162 A.2d 513, 516 (Conn.
1960).
237. Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 at 352.
238. Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1956).





been sustained in at least some measure on the first ingestion of
the drug, and the cause of action to be complete at that point.
Under traditional rules, the limitations period would begin to
run immediately. Often, however, injury from such a cause
may not reveal itself in diagnosable symptoms of disease or in-
jury for many years, frequently after the patient's opportunity
to file a lawsuit in a timely fashion has expired.
Under a discovery rule, the limitations period begins to run
at the time when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the illness and the
relationship between a third party's conduct and that illness.241
Illustrative of the application of such a discovery rule, albeit in
the context of a defendant's verdict, is the conclusion reached in
Keith-Popp v. Eli Lilly & Co. 242 Keith-Popp was an action com-
menced by a mother who experienced difficulties during her
pregnancy with her second child comparable to those she had
experienced with her first child, and which she attributed to her
in utero exposure to DES. 243 The court held that the forum's
three-year statute of limitations, governing her action in the
pregnancy for her second child, commenced to run when she
learned that the pregnancy problems with the first child were
attributable to DES.244 Other authority would apply a standard
that the period of limitations would commence at the time the
injury or damage first became ascertainable to the plaintiff or,
where plaintiff is a minor, to those representing plaintiff.245
241. See Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 490 A.2d 43, 46 (R.I. 1985) (stating discov-
ery rule is applicable where manifestation of the injury, the cause of the injury,
and the facts sufficient to permit recognition of relation between manufacturer's
conduct and the injury occur at different points in time).
242. 639 F. Supp. 1479 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
243. See id. at 1480-81.
244. Id. at 1482-83. The court concluded that the damages sought in plain-
tiffs second cause of action are consequences of DES-caused premature labor and
delivery, and the claim is time-barred because it occurred more than three years
before the filing of this lawsuit. See id.
245. See, e.g., Cowan by Cowan v. Lederle Labs., 604 F. Supp. 438, 443 (D.
Kan. 1985). In that action for damages for discoloration of a minor's teeth from
ingestion of tetracycline, the court held that the application of Kansas's two-year
statute of limitations presented factual questions as to when plaintiff last took the
pharmaceutical manufactured by the defendant, and when the discoloration of
plaintiffs teeth was first reasonably ascertainable to the plaintiff or to her parents.





It cannot be gainsaid that one objective of public law and
private law, as reflected in the many Restatements, is the provi-
sion of rules of general applicability that actors may appreciate
and employ to govern their conduct accordingly, that attorneys
can interpret rationally (assuming the ordinary latitude of the
advocacy process), and that courts can apply evenhandedly. An
au currant metaphor is "transparency." As regards the accident
law subcategory of products liability, the objective of the Ameri-
can Law Institute and the diverse state legislatures is to pre-
sent standards that can be seen to be sufficiently elastic to
accommodate the multitude of injury scenarios, yet sufficiently
rigid to cabin the decisional law pursuant thereto into a moder-
ately coherent whole.
Pharmaceutical products liability law departs from all
other dimensions of products liability. This liability doctrine in-
volves not simply products, but products that if defective can
create the highest degree of risk of death or serious bodily in-
jury. The same, of course, could be said of a multitude of prod-
ucts that might be purchased at any well provisioned hardware
store. However prescription pharmaceuticals, blood, and biolog-
ical products differ from ordinary products, because if defective,
they will routinely create the highest levels of risk. At the same
time, these ethical drugs and their biological counterparts are
not simply products, but also medicines. A substantial propor-
tion of such medicines have the highest importance in matters
of private and public health.
As a consequence, pharmaceutical products liability law
has endeavored to adopt a balanced regimen of liability rules
that vigorously preserves the right of injured parties to gain in-
demnification for harm caused by defective products, while pro-
viding simultaneously a suitable degree of protection for the
manufacturers of such products, in recognition of (1) the una-
voidable risks posed by many pharmaceuticals and therapies;
and (2) the societal desire that the research, development, and
marketing of potentially important new drugs not be impeded
by the more rigorous liability rules applicable to ordinary
products.
No other realm of accident law has required the reconcilia-




levels of risk, but produced by manufacturers needing the high-
est degree of liability solicitude. In some settings, activities of
an irreducible level of risk, such as the manufacture and han-
dling of radioactive materials, have not been immunized from
tort liability, in part because the legislative authors were un-
willing to displace broad areas of state liability prerogatives. 246
In other products liability precincts, such as motor vehicles,
which involve avoidable product defects and thus reasonably re-
ducible risks, the manufacturers are subject to ordinary liabil-
ity rules. 247
Restatement Second of Torts § 402A, with its concomitant
comments j and k, has represented a worthy resolution of the
policy tension between (1) compensating persons injured by de-
fective pharmaceuticals; and (2) creating a negligence safe har-
bor for manufacturers who market products reflecting the
highest cautionary considerations known or knowable to the
medical and scientific community. Products Liability Restate-
ment § 6 refines this policy compromise with its quite specific
circumference for the manufacturer's design or formulation ob-
ligations, essentially immunizing from liability sellers who
properly market pharmaceuticals that do in fact have a thera-
peutic value to a recognized class of patients. As to warnings,
the Third Restatement authors follow the widely-approved deci-
sional law compromise that countenances the provision of warn-
ings and instructions to the medical community, save in the
very limited circumstances in which the health care provider's
role as to or relationship with the patient is so remote as to com-
mend direct warnings to the patient.
In sum, the Institute's widely followed Restatement Second
of Torts § 402A, read together with the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 6, reflect a recognition of the most
246. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). Referencing the
Price Anderson Act, Pub. L. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1994)), the Supreme Court observed that "Congress assumed that
persons injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort reme-
dies." Id. at 252. "For example, the [Joint] committee rejected a suggestion that it
adopt a federal tort to replace existing state remedies, noting that such displace-
ment of state remedies would engender great opposition." Id. at 254.
247. See generally OWEN ET AL., supra note 7, at §§ 21:1, 21:2, 21:3, discussing
automotive products liability, including automotive design defects and the manu-
facturer's obligation to design a car that is reasonably "crashworthy."
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difficult but tolerable tension between the tort goal requiring
blameworthy actors to indemnify victims of defective products,
while at the same time providing pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers the breathing space to perform their optimal tasks, the de-
velopment and marketing of often unavoidably unsafe, but
frequently highly beneficial, prescription pharmaceu-
ticals.
51
